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Abstract: In order to accurately assess the hazard caused by cross-space cascading failure in the cyber-physical power
system, we propose a quantitative assessment method. This method builds a comprehensive framework of assessment
that takes into account the betweenness centrality of attack graph and the consequences of failure. The betweenness
centrality of each node in the attack graph is used to characterize the frequency of failure. By calculating the number
of all nodes on each attack path, the frequency of a certain fault is calculated. The power loss of physical node caused
by each cross-space cascading failure is used to characterize the consequences of the fault, which is combined with the
frequency of failure and the urgency of troubleshooting to calculate the hazard assessment value of the cross-space
cascading failure. Finally, a variety of cross-space cascading failures are implemented in the simulation environment of
local cyber-physical power system and their hazards are evaluated. The effectiveness of the proposed assessment method
is verified.
Key words: Cyber-physical power system, cyberattack, cross-space cascading failure, fault hazard assessment

1. Introduction
The Cyber-physical power system (CPPS) is a two-dimensional heterogeneous system that realizes the deep
coupling of power physical system and cyber space. Its power flow and information flow are interactive and
cooperative [1]. As a new form of power system development, CPPS will be an important way to realize smart
grid and energy internet [2, 3]. With the increasing integration of the information side and the physical side of
the power system, attacks in the cyber space may eventually trigger failures in the physical space. Such failures
are called cross-space cascading failures. For example, in February 2006, the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security organized a drill to simulate power system anomalies in multiple states caused by the cyberattacks [4].
In 2010, the “Stuxnet” virus attacked the nuclear centrifuge in Iran’s power plant and caused severe damage
to nuclear industrial infrastructures [5]. Combining the characteristics of failures with mathematical methods
to accurately evaluate the hazards of CPPS cross-space cascading failures is of great significance in the current
industrial applications of smart grids.
In early research, the security of CPPS was discussed only at a macrolevel: For example, reference[6]
demonstrated the possibility of large-scale power outages due to cyberattacks; reference [7] explores the connection between cyberattacks and power system disturbances, and points out that attacks on information systems
may disrupt the transient stability of the power system. Some researchers have conceived several typical types
of cross-space cascading failures based on actual power business scenarios and deduced their generation pro∗ Correspondence:
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cesses. References [8, 9] construct cross-space cascading failures for electrical primary and secondary equipment
such as circuit breakers, flexible alternative current transmission systems (FACTS), automatic voltage con-trol
(AVC) in smart substations. Combined with the IEEE 39-node model, it was confirmed that cyberattacks can
cause power secondary equipment or system failure, and then induce power system disturbances, endangering
the normal operation of CPPS. However, the above researches have certain limitations. On the one hand, it is
only proposed at macrolevel that CPPS will face greater security risks after the deep integration of cyber space
and power systems, and it does not detail all possible categories of cross-space cascading failures. On the other
hand, the research results of cross-space cascading failures in specific business scenarios lack universality and
there are too many constraints.
At present, some research results have been made in the causes and hazard assessments of cross-space
cascading failures: For example, reference [10] discussed the harms of delay, interruption, bit errors and other
factors in power communication network on operation of power system; references [11–15] used attack graphs,
complex networks, game theory and other methods to assess the hazard of cross-space cascading failures to
power systems.
The current research on hazard assessment of cross-space cascading failures is mainly from two perspectives. On the one hand, researchers only pay attention to the construction of attack graph in power systems or
cyber-physical power systems and discuss the dangers of their connectivity to system operation [16–18]. On the
other hand, researchers only pay attention to the direct damage caused by faults that present on the operation
of the power system and grid cyber-physical system (GCPS). In references [19–21], the failures’ impact of the
power system is assessed respectively according to the stability change of system transient, change of load,
change of energy consumption and migration of tidal current. A series of methods for evaluating the credibility
indicators of software of cyber-physical system (CPS) is proposed in references [22, 23]. By analyzing the dynamic and multistage characteristics of CPPS cascading failures, based on multiple indicators such as change
of tidal current and topological integrity, the hazard of cascading failures have been evaluated in reference
[24]. According to the evolution mechanism of cross-space cascading failures, a detection method combining
misuse detection and anomaly detection is proposed in references [25, 26]. However, the above researchers only
consider one certain factor that affects the magnitude of the failure hazard. The scope of the research has
great limitations. On the one hand, some researches only pay attention to the connectivity of cascading failures
attack graphs, caused the lack of quantitative calculation indicators that can directly reflect the final physical
loss caused by the failure. On the other hand, in some other works, the degree of hazard is reflected only by the
migration of tidal current, variation of power or load loss that is explicitly displayed in the final physical space.
The characteristics of the attack graphs are not combined, so it could not reflect the important characteristics
of the CPPS cross-space cascading failures affected by the cyber-physical interaction.
In order to accurately and comprehensively assess the hazards of cross-space cascading failures on the
safand stable operation of CPPS, this paper proposes a hazard assessment method that comprehensively
considers the betweenness centrality of attack graph and the power loss of the attack target.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
1)We proposed a quantitative assessment framework of hazard assessment , which takes into account the
ratio of power loss of attack target and the betweenness centrality of attack paths in attack graph. The index
system adopted in this assessment framework includes two kinds of indicators that can reflect the frequency
and the impact of the final consequences of failures.
2) Based on the attack graph model of CPPS cross-space cascading failure, the fault transmission process
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is analyzed in detail. Meanwhile, considering the influence of constraints on the results of hazard assessment,
the disturbance trigger probability Pc is introduced into the assessment method, and the influence of different
values of Pc on the results of fault hazard assessment is thoroughly discussed.
3) With the model of 110 kV smart substation as reference, a local CPPS experimental environment is
built, and three typical cross-space cascading failures caused by cyberattacks are simulated. Consequently, the
effectiveness of the assessment method is verified by quantifying the hazard assessment results of simulation
failures and comparing it with those obtained by the assessment method proposed in this paper.
2. The betweenness centrality of attack graph
2.1. The definition of betweenness centrality
Betweenness centrality is a global property of directed graph that is closely related to the connectivity. The
shortest path is to use Dijkstra algorithm [27] or Floyd algorithm [28] to calculate the shortest path between
any two points on the weighted directed graph. Betweenness centrality reflects the influence of certain nodes
or edges on the connectivity of the entire network. Thus it has important practical significance in the fields of
community relations, allocation of resource and topology analysis of cyber security, etc. [29].
The betweenness centrality of nodes is one of the main indicator used in the assessment method proposed
in this paper. The larger the betweenness centrality of a node, the more frequently the node is used by the
shortest path in the entire network, which indicates that the node is more critical to the overall network
structure. As shown in Figure 1, it is a six-node weighted directed graph. The betweenness centrality is related
to the shortest path. According to the formula derived from the Dijkstra algorithm of the weighted directed
graph, the betweenness centrality of nodes A, D, and C are 0, 0, 2. For example, because the number of shortest
paths through node D is 0, the betweenness centrality of node D is 0. The betweenness centrality of node A is
0 because A is the starting point of the path. The betweenness centrality of node B is 4, which is the largest
(i.e. the proportion of the shortest paths through node B to the total number of shortest paths is the largest).
Therefore, the node B is the “key node” of the directed graph.
2.2. The calculation of the betweenness centrality
2.2.1. The betweenness centrality of node
If there are n nodes in a directed graph, the betweenness centrality of the i-th node (i.e. bc(i) ) can be calculated
by Formula (1):
bc(i) =

n
∑
σst (i)
.
σst

(1)

s̸=i̸=t

In Formula (1), σst denotes the total number of all shortest paths from node s to node t, and σst (i) denotes the
number of shortest paths through node i in the shortest paths from node s to node t. The practical meaning of
bc(i) is the ratio of the number of shortest paths from node s to node t through node i to the total number of
all shortest paths from node s to node t .
The calculating process of Formula (1) is similar to Floyd shortest path algorithm, therefore, bc(i) can
be calculated by improving the Floyd algorithm:
1) It can consider the attack graph as a weighted directed graph with all edge weights of 1. Firstly, we
solve the shortest path between any two nodes s and t of attack graph based on its adjacency matrix, and
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Figure 1. Illustrates the betweenness centrality of nodes and edges in diagraph.

count the sum of shortest paths between every pair of nodes s and t (i.e. σst ).
2) For any node i, if and only if the D(s, t) , which means the distance between nodes s and t, match
the condition that D(s, t) = D(s, i) + D(i, t) and σst ̸= 0 , then the node i is on the shortest path between s
and t . σst (i) is calculated.
3) For all n nodes on the attack graph, the sum

∑n
s̸=i̸=t

σst (i)
is calculated.
σst

2.2.2. The betweenness centrality of edge
If there are m edges in a directed graph, the betweenness centrality of the j-th edge ( i.e. bcj ) can be calculated
by Formula (2):
bcj =

m
∑
δpq (j)
.
δpq
p,q∈n

(2)

In Formula (2), δpq denotes the total number of shortest paths from node p to node q, and δpq (j) denotes
the number of shortest paths through the j-th edge in the shortest path from node p to node q. In addition,
bcj denotes the proportion of the number of shortest paths through node i from node p to node q to the total
number of all shortest paths from node p to node q. The calculation of bcj is similar to that of bc(i), which
can be solved by improving the shortest path algorithm.
3. Cross-space cascading failure hazard assessment method
3.1. General framework of assessment method
{Ci} denotes any node in the cyber space, {Pi} denotes any node in the physical space. Based on the analysis
of the causes of CPPS failures, it is known that the occurrence of cross-space cascading failures is closely related
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to the information-physical interaction. Therefore, its transmission path is consistent with the transmission
path of the information-physical coupling event chain. It all starts from several nodes {Ci} in the cyber space,
and propagates through the information-power flow to several nodes {Pi} in the physical space that have a
mapping relationship with {Ci}. Then the power flow spreads from {Pi} to other power nodes, eventually
causing large-scale cascading failures. Therefore, the starting point of the cross-space cascading failure is the
cyberattack on the information topology node, and the end point is the disturbance generated by the physical
topology node. So, the attack graph model representing cross-space cascading failures is vertical in space and
orthogonal to the horizontal topology network of CPPS, as shown in Figure 2.
Event space
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control signal
device

Denial of service
attack

Malicious Use
Attack

Rejection of control
signal device

Rejection of
protective device

Transmission line
Cut/Release

Parameter adjustment
of transmission line

Misoperation
of control signal
device

Denial of
service attack

Malicious
Use Attack

Rejection of
protective
device

Outage of
protective
device

Load
shedding

Load power
fluctuation

Figure 2. Orthogonal relationship between CPPS physical topology and attack graph.

3.1.1. Mapping of attack graph on CPPS physical topology
Attack graph and attack subgraph. As shown in Figure 3, each node on the attack graph represents an
cyberattack, secondary equipment fault or a primary disturbance. Each directed edge in the graph represents
the driving relationship between the failure events. If a node of cyberattack is connected with the secondary
equipment fault by the directed edge, it indicates that the attack step can be implemented. Each attack path
must satisfy the following conditions: It starts from the node of cyberattack of the L1 layer, passes through
the node of secondary equipment fault of the L2 layer, and reaches the node of primary disturbance of the L3
layer, and finally converges on the node of the L4 layer representing “N-1 disturbance of the power system”.
The specific fault names represented by each node in Figure 3 are shown in Table 1.
By mapping the attack graph of cross-space cascading failures shown in Figure 3 to the actual physical
topology of CPPS, a local attack subgraph can be obtained. It reveals the types and evolutionary relationships of
cross-space cascading failures that exist in the CPPS topological operating environment. This paper chooses the
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Figure 3. CPPS attack graph.

Table 1. The specific fault name represented by the attack graph nodes.

Node
V1
V2
V3

Node
V9
V10
V11

V4
V5

Specific fault name
Denial of service attack
Exploitative attack
Measurement deviation of measuring
equipment
Misoperation of control signal device
Rejection of control signal device

V6
V7

Outage of control signal device
Misoperation of protective equipment

V14
V15

V8

rejection of protective equipment

V16

V12
V13

Specific fault name
Outage of protective equipment
Engine cut/release
Variation of operating parameters of
power supply
Transmission line cut/release
Variation of operating parameters of
transmission
load cut/release
Variation of operating parameters of
load
“N-1” disturbance in power system

operating topology of intelligent substation which conforms to IEC 62351 standard [30]. The attack subgraph
obtained by mapping the attack graph of cross-space cascading failure to this topology is shown in Figure 4.

V1 Denial of service attack

V2 Malicious Use Attack

V4 Misoperation of control V5 Rejection of control V6 Outage of control V7 Misoperation of V8 Rejection of
signal device
protective device
protective device
signal device
signal device

V12 Transmission line
Cut/Release

Figure 4. Subgraph of CPPS attack graph.
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Edge weight of attack graph. The reciprocal of attack profit or loss for each attack step can be used
as the edge weights of attack subgraphs. It is used for subsequent calculation of the betweenness centrality of
each directed edge. The definition and calculation method of attack profit or loss are elaborated in reference
[31]. Using the calculation method proposed in reference [31], the value of attack profit or loss of each single-step
attack in the attack subgraph shown in Figure 4 is calculated. The reciprocal of attack profit or loss value of
each single-step attack is used as the weight on each directed edge. The edge with an edge weight of “ 1/ + ∞ ”
indicates that the corresponding secondary equipment fault will be latent in the system with a hidden failure
that occurs in non-real time, and a transient disturbance will be triggered with a certain conditional probability
in the subsequent process.
During the propagation of CPPS cross-space cascading failures, the fault will eventually cause the “N-1”
failure of the power physical system (i.e. any independent physical device or power line is cut off) . For example,
a tampering attack on the communication network of a substation caused the protective device to malfunction.
As a result, the breaker of the substation mistakenly cut the bus line. The final consequence can be manifested
by the obvious power loss of affected bus line [32]. Therefore, the assessment method proposed in this paper
adds the amount of power loss as one of the assessment indicators.
3.1.2. The hazard factor and assessment framework
According to the failure mode of general industrial system, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA), the index
system for failure hazard assessment includes three basic factors: frequency of failure, impact of consequence
and emergency degree of troubleshooting. The general method of failure hazard classification is to calculate the
hazard level of the failure synthetically by three factors. But in the transmission process of specific cross-space
cascading failure in CPPS, if a single fault exists in multiple attack paths, it proves that such a fault is more
likely to cause severe system disturbances. The scope of such a fault will be lager, and the overall consequences
are generally more serious [15].
The key idea of the failure hazard assessment method proposed in this paper is to combine the betweenness
centrality of attack paths with the power loss factor. Then we can obtain a unified evaluation value to quantify
the hazard level of cross-space cascading failures. This unified evaluation value is named “cross-space cascading
failure hazard factor”, and the calculation method is explained in detail below.
According to mentioned above, the framework considers both the frequency of failure and the power loss
of attacking target. It is necessary to establish a formula for calculating the failure hazard factor with these
two indicators as variables. In order to indicate the proportion of the impact of each indicator on the failure
hazard factor, the calculation method is to multiply the frequency factor with the power loss factor.
As showing in Figure 3, each attack path represents a certain cross-space cascading failure, which starts
from the node V1 or V2 of L1 and converges to the node V16 of L4 . There are nine attack paths in Figure 4.
To assess the cross-space cascading failure hazard represented by k-th attack path, the hazard factor of this
attack path is defined as Rk , as Formula (3), kϵ{1, 2, · · · , 9}:
Rk = BCk × ∆Pk .

(3)

In Formula (3), BCk denotes the total betweenness centrality of the k-th attack path, which is calculated
by the product of the betweenness centrality of all nodes and the betweenness centrality of all edges in the path
k. ∆Pk denotes the comprehensive fault influence factor caused by cross-space cascading failures represented by
the path k . The detailed calculation methods of BCk and ∆Pk are given in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, respectively.
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3.2. The total betweenness centrality of attack path: BCk
According to the above, the attack path, representing certain kind of cross-space cascading failure, is a multimode
event chain model composed of multiple attack paths. Each attack path consists of several independent fault
nodes. Each directed edge connecting the precursor node and the successor node on the attack path represents
the driving relationship of single-step attack. The weighted value of the directed edge is the profit or loss value
of the single-step attack, which indicates the diﬀiculty of the single-step attack.
A strong correlation logic is formed between attacking nodes. Therefore, the cumulative multiplication of
betweenness centrality of all independent fault nodes passing through each attack path is taken as the frequency
factor of cross-space cascading failures represented by the total betweenness centrality of the attack path. The
cumulative multiplication of the betweenness centrality of all edges in the attack path is taken as the emergency
degree factor of the cross-space cascading failure removal represented by the total betweenness centrality of the
attack path. The total betweenness centrality value BCk of each attack path is obtained by the two kinds of
betweenness centrality. The calculation method of BCk is as follows Formula (4).

BCk =

x
∏

bc(i) ×

i=i

y
∏

bcj

(4)

i=j

In Formula (4), x is the number of nodes passing through the k-th attack path, and bc(i) is the value of
betweenness centrality of the i − th node on this attack path. When calculating the betweenness centrality of
each node, the number of paths with the node itself as the starting point or end point is not counted (i.e. the
value of bc(i) of the start and end points of each attack path is always 0) . Therefore, when using Formula (4)
to calculate the BCk of every attack path, only the betweenness centrality of intermediate nodes on the path
are multiplied. y is the number of directed edges passing through the k-th attack path, and bcj is the value of
betweenness centrality of the j − th directed edge on this attack path.

3.3. Influence factor of failure consequence: ∆Pk
Pc is the conditional probability of electric primary disturbance. According to the attack graph of CPPS, it can
be known that after the occurrence of secondary equipment fault, there is some certain external constraint for
the triggering of the relevant primary disturbance. Some of the disturbances will occur immediately after the
secondary equipment fault, such as the circuit breaker malfunction caused by the malicious control command,
resulting in the transmission line to be disconnected. In addition to this, the other secondary equipment faults
cause the primary disturbances in the indirect and nonreal-time way. For example, after a protective device is
failed by the DoS attack, a disturbance will be triggered only when the power load changes and the protective
device needs to operate.
We define the conditional probability of electric primary disturbances as Pc , and the value of Pc is
determined by the topology of power system and the power measurement value of the CPPS physical side.
Generally, if a certain secondary fault can instantly trigger a primary disturbance, the value of condition
probability (i.e. Pc ) is 1.
∆p is the ratio of power loss. In order to calculate the power loss factor, we define ∆p as the ratio of
power loss due to a kind of disturbances caused by cross-space cascading failures. The calculation method of
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∆p is shown as Formula (5).
′

∆p =

|p − p |
p

(5)
′

In Formula (5), p is the initial power of the target system, and p is the power of the system after a
disturbance occurs. Combining the ∆p with Pc , we can define the power loss factor of the k-th attack path in
the attack graph as ∆Pk . ∆Pk can be calculated using Formula (6).
∆Pk = Pc × ∆p

(6)

3.4. The calculation of failure hazard assessment factor
Using Formula (1), the values of the betweenness centrality of each node in Figure 4 can be calculated, and the
betweenness centrality of each edge can be calculated according to Formula (2). According to Formula (4), the
BCk of each attack path in Figure 4 can be calculated by combining the betweenness centrality of node and
the betweenness centrality of edge.
For nodes in Figure 4, the conditional probability that V5 , V6 , V8 , and V9 trigger the primary disturbance
is Pc , and the value range of Pc is [0,1). However, other secondary faults, such as misoperation of control signal
device and misoperation of protective device, represented by nodes V6 and V7 on L2 layer will instantly trigger
the steady state of the power system changing to unsteady state, so the value of Pc of V3 , V4 and V7 is 1. After
mapping the attack graph to the actual local topology of CPPS, the specific type of primary disturbance can be
determined, and the ∆p can be calculated by Formula (5). In this paper, the power loss caused by the primary
disturbance on the transmission represented by node V12 in Figure 4 is abbreviated as ∆ptrans .
The conditional probability of electric primary disturbance Pc and the ratio of power loss ∆p of each
attack path are substituted into the Formula (6). The power loss factors of nine cross-space cascading failure
attack paths in Figure 4 are calculated, as shown in Table 2.
By substituting the results in Table 1 into Formula (3), the hazard factor Rk of cross-space cascading
failure represented by each attack path in Figure 4 is calculated, as shown in Table 3.
Table 2. The power loss factors of nine cross-space cascading failure attack paths in Figure 4.

The path of cross-space failure
(V1 , V5 , V12 )
(V1 , V6 , V12 )
(V1 , V9 , V12 )
(V2 , V4 , V12 )
(V2 , V9 , V12 )

Rk
Pc ·∆ptrans
Pc · ∆ptrans
Pc · ∆ptrans
∆ptrans
Pc · ∆ptrans

The path of cross-space failure
(V2 , V5 , V12 )
(V2 , V6 , V12 )
(V2 , V7 , V12 )
(V2 , V8 , V12 )
-

Rk
Pc · ∆ptrans
Pc · ∆ptrans
∆ptrans
Pc · ∆ptrans
-

4. Experiment
4.1. The implement of simulation environment
In order to verify the rationality of the failure hazard assessment method proposed in this paper, the CEPRI-36
node simulation environment based on an 110kV intelligent substation structure is selected to build a local
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Table 3. The hazard factor Rk of cross-space cascading failure represented by each attack path in Figure 4.

The path of cross-space failure
(V1 , V5 , V12 )
(V1 , V6 , V12 )
(V1 , V9 , V12 )
(V2 , V4 , V12 )
(V2 , V9 , V12 )

Rk
0.89Pc ·∆ptrans
0.89Pc · ∆ptrans
1.22Pc · ∆ptrans
0.17∆ptrans
1.37Pc · ∆ptrans

The path of cross-space failure
(V2 , V5 , V12 )
(V2 , V6 , V12 )
(V2 , V7 , V12 )
(V2 , V8 , V12 )
-

Rk
0.67Pc · ∆ptrans
0.67Pc · ∆ptrans
0.17∆ptrans
0.39Pc · ∆ptrans
-

CPPS model, as shown in Figure 5. The detailed components of the simulation environment are described in
Appendix.
CEPRI -36 n ode simulation circuit diagram

monitoring
system

recording sub
detection system
attack&
remote control stationdefense platform
system

switch of station control layer

protective device

control signal device

switch of process layer
simulation
merging unit
SV protocol

intelligent terminal
Goose protocol

analog transformer

analog circuit breaker BUS9

Figure 5. The simulation environment of CPPS based on the CEPRI-36 node simulation environment of 110 kV
intelligent substation structure.

In the initial simulation environment, the CEPRI-36 node system is in normal operating state. The
position where the disturbance occurs is selected as the i-terminal of the BUS9 node, and the circuit breaker
action is simulated to control the open and closure of the BUS9. The simulation cyberattack types include DoS
(denial of service) attack and malicious exploit attack, and real-time capture and analysis of communication
message in controlling layer are implemented at the same time to record the entire process of cyberattack.
Because the simulation environment is based on the structure of smart substation, and the target
equipment is selected as control signal device and protective device of controlling layer. The attack subgraph
of attack paths is considered same as Figure 4.
4.2. Cross-space cascading failure simulation
In order to more intuitively and accurately reflect the performance of this assessment method, it is necessary
to select cyberattack types that occur as frequently as possible in the CPPS simulation environment for exper1488
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iments. According to the historical statistics of various kinds of cyberattacks in CPPS simulation environment,
buffer overflow attack, DoS attack and fuzzing attack are selected to carry out simulations of cross-space cascading failures. In this experiment, different cyberattacks will finally cause different cross-space cascading failures,
which can be divided into three types:
4.2.1. Buffer overflow attack
Firstly, the IP address of the target host and the communication port of control message are determined by
the IP address and port scanning tool of the mobile attack and defense platform. Then the host is intruded
by buffer overflow attack, and malicious control program is implanted into the host through remote control
software. Finally, wrong operation commands are sent to the intelligent terminal connected to the target host,
resulting in misoperation of simulated circuit breaker.
As shown in Figure 6, after the malicious control attack is carried out, some attack messages are
intercepted by the packet capture tool. It can be seen that the message contains commands leading to
misoperation of the simulated circuit breaker.

Figure 6. Specific information such as the time, source and destination IP of the malicious control attack message.

4.2.2. Denial of service attack
By using UDP flood tool, a large number of protocol messages of false user packets are sent to the protective
device at the same time, which could run out the communication bandwidth of the protective device, thus
paralyzing the whole communication system. As a result, the Goose/SV message can no longer be sent and
received normally, thus making the remote control center unable to control the circuit breaker through protective
device. Once the operating status of the power system changes, the protective device needs to operate. But the
circuit breaker is actually out of control, a power primary disturbance will occur subsequently.
4.2.3. Fuzzing attack
To carry out fuzzing attack through the mobile attack and defense platform, a large number of deformed
messages which violate the IEC 61850 protocol [33] are sent to the protective device. If the protective device
fails to handle the deformed messages properly, it will be down and restart. Cyclic restart within a certain
period of time will cause the communication function between the protective device and the simulated circuit
breaker to be paralyzed, causing the protective device to lose control of the simulated circuit breaker. Generally,
fuzzing attack messages have malformed features such as a overlong length, invalid SPDU filler characters or
illegal MAC destination addresses. For example, the message “03 00 B3 90 11 E0 00 00 00 04 00 C1 02 00 01
C2 02 00 01 C0 01 0A” whose “packet length” field value “B3 90” exceeds the range, which means this is a
deformed message that cannot be parsed by the protective device.
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4.3. Analysis of experimental results
By using transient analysis tools of power system, it can be know that in the simulation environment of CEPRI36 bus system in the initial operating state, the proportion of power loss caused by disconnection of BUS9 node
due to the malfunction of the circuit breaker is 38.16% , which means the value of ∆ptrans in Table 2 is 0.3816.
With the accurate value of ∆ptrans , the value Rk in Table 3 of all cross-space cascading failures in the current
simulation environment can be calculated, as shown in Table 4.
Table 4. The values of Rk of simulated cascading failures attack paths.

The path of attack
(V1 , V5 , V12 )
(V1 , V6 , V12 )
(V1 , V9 , V12 )
(V2 , V4 , V12 )
(V2 , V5 , V12 )

Rk
0.89 ∗ 0.3816Pc
0.89 ∗ 0.3816Pc
1.22 ∗ 0.3816Pc
0.17 ∗ 0.3816
0.67 ∗ 0.3816Pc

The path of attack
(V2 , V6 , V12 )
(V2 , V7 , V12 )
(V2 , V8 , V12 )
(V2 , V9 , V12 )
-

Rk
0.67 ∗ 0.3816Pc
0.17 ∗ 0.3816
0.39 ∗ 0.3816Pc
1.37 ∗ 0.3816Pc
-

In the local CPPS simulation environment, three attack paths ⟨V1 , V5 , V12 ⟩, ⟨V2 , V4 , V12 ⟩and ⟨V2 , V8 , V12 ⟩
are selected to represent the simulated attacks. Based on the simulation results, the hazard of these three
cross-space cascading failures is evaluated to verify the effectiveness of the proposed failure hazard assessment
method, as shown in Table 5.
Table 5. The ranking of the cross-space cascading failure hazard factor Rk represented by the three attack paths could
be determined by the value range of Pc .

The path of attack

Rk

The process of cross-space cascading failure simulation

(V1 , V9 , V12 )

1.22 ∗ 0.3816Pc

(V2 , V4 , V12 )

0.17 ∗ 0.3816

(V2 , V8 , V12 )

0.39 ∗ 0.3816Pc

The protective device is attacked
by DoS and the communication
function is paralyzed. It cannot process the status information sent back by the simulated
circuit breaker.
The control signal device is attacked by buffer overflow and receives the wrong line monitoring
data, which causes the misoperation of simulated circuit breaker.
Protective devices are attacked
by Fuzzing attack and lose control of simulated circuit breakers

External conditions for triggering power primary disturbance of
electric
Changes in the operating status
of the power system

None

Changes in the operating status
of the power system

Table 5 shows that the ranking of the cross-space cascading failure hazard factor Rk represented by
the three attack paths could be determined by the value range of Pc . In this experiment, focusing on the
cross-domain effect of fault, the comprehensive fault influence factor is taken the form of modulo of the complex
number, and the value range of Pc is divided into the following two cases:
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Case 1: 0.39*0.3816 Pc ≤0.17*0.3816≤1.22*0.3816Pc . By solving the inequality of Case 1, the range
of Pc is [0.14,0.43) . It shows that when the conditional probability of electric primary disturbance Pc is in
[0.14,0.43), the attack path with the highest value of failure hazard assessment is ⟨V1 , V9 , V12 ⟩ , while the attack
path with the lowest value of failure hazard assessment is ⟨V2 , V8 , V12 ⟩ .
Case 2: 0.17*0.3816+0.25i ≤0.39*0.3816Pc ≤1.22*0.3816 Pc . By solving the inequality of Case 2, the
range of Pc is [0.43,1] . It shows that when Pc is in [0.43,1] , the attack path with the highest failure hazard
assessment is ⟨V1 , V9 , V12 ⟩, while the attack path with the lowest failure hazard assessment is ⟨V2 , V4 , V12 ⟩.
Through the analysis of the above simulation results, the following conclusions can be drawn:
1) According to the steps of simulation experiments, the cause and evolution of cross-space cascading
failures are closely related to the coupling interaction between cyber space and physical space. The evolution
process of most cross-space cascading failures has a causal relationship of “cyber disturbance → power secondary
equipment fault → power primary disturbance” , which represents a typical event chain model.
2) From the perspective of cyberattack methods, the cross-space cascading failures caused by DoS attack
and fuzzing attack will trigger a perturbation only when the operating status of power system changes (i.e. only
when Pc =1, the damage of the failure will be explicit on the primary side of the power system, and the simulated
circuit breaker will trigger a primary disturbance due to out-of-control) . When the power system is in steady
state, the secondary equipment faults caused by these two types of cyberattacks will be hidden in the system
in the form of non-real-time invisible faults. Therefore, during the corresponding failure hazard assessment,
the value of Pc needs to be discussed. For the malfunction of control devices caused by malicious control
attacks, a corresponding disturbance will be triggered directly. Although the value of Pc is not considered,
the implementation of malicious control attacks is more diﬀicult than DoS attack. Therefore, the betweenness
centrality of this attack path reflected the frequency of failure and the emergency degree of troubleshooting is
low, and the assessment value Rk of malicious control attack is not necessarily higher than that caused by DoS
attack.
3) By analyzing the failure hazard assessment results of three simulated attacks, the total betweenness
centrality of each attack path representing each failure is regarded as the first coeﬀicient of Rk . The larger the
coeﬀicient, the greater the comprehensive evaluation value of the frequency of failure and the emergency degree
of troubleshooting. After adding the power loss factor to Rk , the ranking of failure hazard assessment values
may change. Some types of cross-space cascading failure do not show high frequency and emergency, but the
direct impact consequences to cyber space or physical space are greater. Interruption and isolation measures
should be taken to deal with these cross-space cascading failures which cause large power loss on physical side.
4) In this simulation experiment, a local CPPS model is built by referencing the intelligent substation
environment, and the disturbance of transmission lines caused by cross-space cascading failures is simulated.
Analogously, cross-space cascading failures can also cause N-1 disturbances at other locations of primary side
such as generators and loads. If multiple cross-space cascading failures concurrently occur in the same local
CPPS environment, multiple devices on primary side will be disturbed at the same time, finally resulting
in power N-X disturbances. In the future work, if it is necessary to assess the N-X disturbances caused by
cooperative cyberattacks, it may be achieved by improving the assessment framework proposed in this paper.
5. Conclusion
The operation of CPPS depends on the mechanism of coupling and interaction between cyber space and physical
space, but it also brings security problems to be solved urgently, especially the harm caused by cross-space
1491

XU et al./Turk J Elec Eng & Comp Sci

cascading failures. In this paper, based on the attack graph model of CPPS cross-space cascading failures, a
method for hazard assessment of cross-space cascading failures is proposed, which considers the betweenness
centrality of attack graph and power loss of the target. This method can be used to quantify the hazards of
various cross-space cascading failures in CPPS.
To further improve this quantitative assessment method of CPPS cross-space cascading failures, adding
other factors into the index system and exploring the monitoring mechanism of cross-space cascading failures
combined with machine learning and data mining will be the focus of the next phase of research.
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Appendix A: 1.Introduction of CPPS simulation environment based on CEPRI-36 The
simulation environment consists of an 110 kV intelligent substation (including the actual system of information
equipment and secondary equipment, the simulation device of primary equipment) and the classical power
system examples (IEEE, CEPRI) in the form of simultaneous digital-analog hybrid simulation. The interaction
between cyber space and physical space in local CPPS can be restored to a limited extent. The simulated
circuit breaker in the simulation environment of intelligent substation is located at the i-terminal of bus BUS9
of CEPRI-36 bus system.
Mobile attack platform is chosen as the tool to implement cyberattacks, which contains a variety of
software to simulate cyberattacks, such as AdVanced Scanner, remote tool of malicious control, UDP flooder
and fuzzing attack. The attack tools are used to attack the information nodes in the local CPPS model (monitor
and protective device of controlling layer) , and the message grabbing tools (Wireshark, etc.) are used to capture
and analyze the network communication messages between the controlling layer and the processing layer. In
addition, in order to simplify the calculation of perturbation effect of the cyberattack on the local CPPS model,
the attacker is restricted to use limited resources (i.e. the global topology of local CPPS simulation model
cannot be fully grasped, and only a single node can be attacked).
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